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Introduetion
Alexis de Tocqueville is sometimes presented as an almost prophetic
political thinker, Annelien De Dijn and Raf Geenens write in their intro-
duetion to this book. This is an appropriate observation, indeed. On law, .
polities, philosophy and other subjects he has presented new ideas that
only much later got the recognition that they deserve. According to
many commentators this also applies to his ideas on religion. After the
relentless onslaught of some radical Enlightenment thinkers on religion
(especially Holbach),1 Tocqueville was one of the most impressive nine-
teenth-century commentators who tried to reconcile modem democ-
racy with religion.ê
My aim in this chapter is to assess the validity of Tocqueville's ideas on
religion within the context of the recent upsurge of religious ideas.
What can we leam from Tocqueville? Can his approach to religion serve
as a souree of inspiration to the way modern European states can deal
with religion, more particularly religious diversity? Is religion indeed, as
Tocqueville contends, important for the maintenance of the democratie
politicalorder? If so, why? If not, what are the alternatives? And are
Tocqueville's ideas, as is often contended, the counterpoint to the
Enlightenment or is his work indebted to the secular tradition as well?
These are the questions I will try to answer in this chapter. I wiIl not
concentrate on whether Tocqueville was sineere in his belief. This is the
subject of a long discussion among Tocqueville scholars. What exactly
did he believe himself? Some commentators speak of his 'indestructible
faith'." According to Joachim Wach, Tocqueville repeatedly indicated bis
views on life and polities were 'firmly rooted in religious conviction and
religious faith'." His stance is that liberty cannot be established without
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morality and morality not without faith." This faith is not every faith in
general. but religious faith in particular, Wach tells us.
This may be true, but it does not mean that Tocqueville himself was a
firm believer. According to other scholars Tocqueville was an 'agnostic'
and a 'spiritualist'." Jean-Louis Benoît points out that, although
Tocqueville remained within the Catholic Church, he was very critical
of Catholic political parties. severely criticized the papal hierarchy of
Pius IX, found dogmatic thinking abhorrent in general and rejected
important religious ideas such as the Immaculate Conception and origi-
nal sin.? He admired the evangelical stories and values incorporated in
those stories, but the central idea of the incarnation and divine charac-
ter of jesus Christ remained alien to him." So even as a 'Christian'
thinker his claims are not very streng." In contemporary vocabulary,
popularized by secularist thinkers such as Daniel Dennett and Richard
Dawkins, the position of Tocqueville could perhaps best be qualified as
'belief in belief'. 10 Someone who has 'belief in belief' sees bellef as a
fiction worth maintaining.
The reasons for this can be diverse: rational calculation as in Pascals
Wager.!' emotional need as with William Iames." or political expedi-
ency." Tocqueville's acknowledgement of religion fitted into the last
category: religion was necessary to uphold the d~mocraticorder. In that
sense his ideas were similar to, although not identical with, those of the
greatest Enlightenment thinker, Voltaire.
Voltaire was very close to the position that religion, in the sense of
belief in the existence of God, is necessary for political reasons (much
closer than his reputation as an anti-religious writer warrants).'! Voltaire
calls himself a 'theist'. But this is not belief in the personal God that
manifested His win in Holy Scripture and sent his son to the earth to
redeem the sins of mankind. but a more abstract almighty God that
takes revenge on evil-doers that escape earthly justice." In his 'Epître à
l'auteur du livre des Trois Imposteurs', Voltaire presents us his notion of
a God that would be socially beneficial.l" Voltaire thinks that all peoples
have sustained the notion of an almighty and perfect God that was the
foundation of social order and justice and the terror of the potential
criminal (and tyrant). So useful is the belief in such a God that if he
would not exist he should be invented ('Si Dieu n'existait pas, if faudrait
l'inventer'). Philosophers in particular should widely circulate this use-
ful belief ('croyance utile')." Not only Voltaire, but also many other
Enlightenment thinkers took this position. In that sense they were not
far from their nineteenth-century conservative detraetors, Burke one of
the fust, who proclaimed: 'We know, and what is better we feel inwardly,
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that religion is the basis of civil society, and the souree of all good and
comfort.r"
What is Tocqueville's position in this discussion? The public role of
religion is not the subject of a separate volume in the work of Tocqueville
but his remarks on religion are dispersed throughout his many writings.'?
The most important passages on the public role of religion are to be
found in his main book, De la démocratie en Amërique/" and in his
correspondence, in particular the correspondence with another great
nineteenth-century thinker: Arthur de Gobineau (1816-1882).21
In what follows I will first give an overview of Tocqueville's ideas on
the public role of religion, analyze his recommendations and present a
critique of his stance. The conclusion of my analysis will be that
although Tocqueville makes many interesting comments on the histori-
cal foundation of the American Republic, some of his ideas on religion
as foundational for the political and moral order are difficult to apply to
modern societies, living, as we do, in a multicultural and multirëligious
context. A commonwealth inspired by (and founded in) one specific
religion was perhaps a possibility in Tocqueville's time, but it is no
longer a possibility in our pluralist times. In modem societies the unify-
ing bond can only be found (as I will try to demonstrate in the following
pages) in a set of secular republican ideas.
Does that make Tocqueville's ideas on religiën and social cohesion
obsolete? Certainly not, because, as we will see, Tocqueville's work
includes many clues to the possibility of a more 'secular reading'. In
some passages Tocqueville does not exclusively refer to one specific
religion as the souree of social cohesion (Christianity), but seems
to leave open the option of a purely secular 'religion' or a public
philosophy as a 'civil religion'. In this last interpretation, his ideas are
not only relevant for contemporary discourse, but may weU be
indispensable.
The correspondence with Gobineau
The correspondence with Gobineau starts with Tocqueville's assignment
of Gobineau as what we would now call his 'research assistanrF When
the correspondence starts (in 1843) Tocqueville is 38 years old and their
exchange of letters continues to his death in 1859. At the start of their
relationship Gobineau is 27 years old, an ambitious young philosopher,
eager to be accepted by the French intellectual public and hoping for the
help of the 'arrivé' Tocqueville. Gobineau is expected to inform
Tocqueville on new developments in the field of ethics and morals in
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the broad sense of these words (so also covering political philosophy)."
The result is an impressive exchange of letters on religious thought, con-
temporary philosophers and related matters. In particular the public
role of Christianity is discussed by these two giants of the nineteenth
century.
Regarding the public role and essence of Christianity the two thinkers
vehemently disagree. Gobineau is critical of Christianity; Tocqueville is
a defender of the Christian faith, especially the thesis that Christianity
is in some form essential for the maintenance of American democracy.
Tocqueville contends that Christianity has caused a revolution in the
field of rights and duties of the people. Christianity, Tocqueville says,
did not bring new duties into existence, but it changed the relationship
of the duties among each other. The 'soft virtues' ('vertus douces'), such
as compassion, humanity and forgiveness were not held in high esteem
in antiquity. Christianity changed all this. 24 Moreover, Christianity not
only meant a revolution for the substance of morals, but also for its foun-
dation. After Christianity, the sanctioning of morality had completely
changed. The meaning of life was seen not in this life any longer, but in
the life hereafter (Tl plaça Ie but de la vie après la vie'). And because of
this change of emphasis, morality got a firm foundation, much better
than would be the case when morality had to stand on its own feet, as
was the case in classical antlqutty." All thë ingredients of Christianity
were preexistent before the appearance of Christ, but because of
Christianity they got a different colouring and they were seen as a
unity." It made of these moral elements a 'religiori', Tocqueville writes.
This new appreciation of religion as the basis of morals was widespread
in the nineteenth century. After the onslaught on religion made by
some of the eighteenth-century philosophes many nineteenth-century
political philosophers revaluated the role of religion as the necessary
socialbond of society," In France this can be found with Chateaubriand,28
joseph de Maistre" and even Benjamin Constant."
Tocqueville is most impressed by the supematural foundation of
morals in religion. A more worldly foundation of morals seems to him -
in the correspondence with Gobineau - a mere 'second best'. When the
supernatural foundation of morality had become shaky, he writes, only
self-interest rightly understood was seen as a basis for morals. This 'rev-
olution'!' was accomplished by the British utilitarians (Bentham,32 later
Mi1l33) , who made it a focal point of their moral theory. Tocqueville's
intention is to counter this development, which had started in the eigh-
teenth century." Gobineau cannot agree with bis older mentor on this
specific topic. 'I have to confess you that I have a completely different
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opinion on Christianity than you,' Gobineau wrote." Sometimes the
temperature rises in the correspondence and the reader wonders
whether their relationship will survive the deep theoretical differences.
But the letters always end with the good wishes to the mutual wives.
The two correspondents also tackle the difficult question how to cope
with the misdeeds that have been perpetrated in the name of religion. 36
Tocqueville indicates that the Christian religion has gone through bar-
baric times and has been affected by those times. But we should not
reproach Christianity with that. All the criticism that has been made of
Christianity has no relevanee for the central message of the Christian
creed, which is that we should love our neighbour like ourselves."
There is much discussion regarding whether Tocqueville was a sineere
believer. As we have seen, Wach speaks of the 'Frenchman's indestructi-
bIe faith'. 38 This faith is certainly not [ust faith in general, but religious
faith in particular. In a letter to one of his friends he writes:
What has always struck me about my country ... has been to see lined
up on one side the men who prize morality, religion, order, and on
the other those who love freedom and the equality of men before the
law. This sight has struck me as the most extraordinary and most
deplorable ever offered a man's view; for all these things which we
separate are, 1 am certain, indissolubly united in the eyes of God.
Theyare all holy things, if I can express myself so, because the great-
ness and happiness of man in this world can come only from the
simultaneous combination of them all."
Wach notes: 'This combination was the great Frenchman's ideal all
through his life.'40 Wach is only one commentator of many who
emphasized the religious, almost apologetic nature of Tocqueville's writ-
ings. There is, of course, a firm basis for such an interpretation, as we
will see, but there is some counter-information as weIl.
Why is religion so important for a democracy like the United States of
America? And would religion also be indispensable for all modern
democracies? To answer these questions we have to put the ideas of
Tocqueville in the context of his view on the development of American
democracy as described in his major work on the subject.
Democracy, equality and Christianity
The first sentence of De la démocratie en Amérique is weIl known: 'Among
the new things that attracted my attention during my stay in the United
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States, none struck me more forcefully than the equality of conditions."!
Equality is a broad principle for Tocqueville. It seems to encompass also
individual freedom and autonomy. In words that prefigure john Stuart
Mill's essay On Liberty (1859)42 Tocqueville prodaims that each individ-
ual is the best judge of what concerns himself alone.43
Another observation that Tocqueville made and that is closely con-
nected to his comment on equality is that the social state of the
Americans is eminently demoeratic. It has had this character since the
birth of the colonies and it had it even more at the time Tocqueville was
writing De la démocratie en Amériquer" The principle of popular sover-
eignty 'looms over each and every aspect of the Anglo-American
political system', Tocqueville asserts." Every page of his book will reveal
new applications of this doctrine, the writer tells us.
His views on political equality and democracy are dearly based on a
view of man. 'Each individual is supposed to be as enlightened, as virtu-
ous and as strong as every other indtvtdual.?" Why does the individual
obey society? He obeys society because union with his fellow men seems
useful to him, and because he knows that such union cannot exist without
a regulatory power.
In everything to do with the duties of citizens to one another, he has
therefore become subject. In everything that regards himself alone,
he remains master. He is free and owes an account of his actions only
to God. Whence this maxim: the individual is the best as weIl as the
only judge of his own interest, and society has the right to direct his
actions only when it feels injured by his activities or when it requires
his cooperation.V
What has this to do with religion, Christianity in particular? The rela-
tion between democracy and its core principle equality on the one hand
and Christianity on the other, is made dear when Tocqueville writes:
'Christianity, which made all men equal in the sight of God, will not
shrink from seeing all citizens as equal in the eyes of the law.'48 This
observation had been made before by Tocqueville and would be reiter-
ated after him countless times." Christianity is the most egalitarian reli-
gion.ë" So 'champions of freedom' should hasten to invoke the aid of
religion, 'for they must know that without morality freedom cannot
reign and without faith there is no basis for morality'."
In some ways Christianity is identical to the American founding idea:
equality. All the greatwriters of antiquity belonged to the slave-owning
aristocracy. It took the coming ofIesus Christ to make people understand
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that all members of the human race are by nature similar and equal,
Tocqueville writes." Not only Christ is the linchpin between equality
and religion, the same could be said of God. 'Men who are similar and
equal readily conceive of the notion of a single God who imposes the
same rules on each of them and grants them future happiness at the
same price.'53The idea of the unity of the human race continually brings
men back to the idea of the unity of the Creator, Tocqueville contends.
Sober, skeptical and sometimes even cynical political commentator as
Tocqueville is, he sounds lyrical when he sketches a common future
under one God:
It seems to me that the more the barriers that divide the nations of
mankind and the citizens of each nation disappear, the more the
human mind tends, as if by its very nature, to embrace the idea of a
single, all-powerful being imposing the same laws in the same way on
everyone equally.f .
As can be expected, Tocqueville also dwells on the historicalorigin of
the American Republic and the significanee religion had for the found-
ing fathers. There is, as is weIl known, the relation between the
Christian colonies and democracy." 'All the ne'Y European colonies
invariably contained at least the germ, if not the mature form, of a com-
plete democracy', Tocqueville tells US.56 Those immigrants or 'pilgrims'
belonged to an English sect with austere Christian principles.
Tocqueville is perfectly right that Puritanism was not just a religious
doctrine, but that it virtually coincided with the most absolute demo-
cratie and republican theories.V When the immigrants landed on the
shores of the new country in 1620 they adopted a covenant, which read:
We, whose names follow, who, for the glory of God, the development
of the Christian faith, and the honor of our fatherland have under-
taken to establish the first colony on these remote shores, we agree in
the present document, by mutual and solemn consent, and before
God, to form ourselves into a body of political society, for the pur-
pose of goveming ourselves and working towards the accomplish-
ment of these designs; and in virtue of this contract, we agree to
promulgate laws, acts and ordinances, and to institute as needed offi-
cials to whom we promise submission and obedienee.58
Here we see the new spectacle of a society·· 'homogeneous in all
its parts'rTocquevïlle writes.ê? Not even classical democracy could
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dream of such a social cohesion, based on the acceptance of common
principles.
These facts are of course weIl known. There is a historical conneetion
between Christianity and the birth of America and there are conceptual
correlations between Christianity and the ideal of equality (all believers
equal in the eyes of God). But that does not imply, to be sure, that reli-
gion was the sole or even the most important factor contributing to the
success of the American Republic. Neither does it imply, of course, that
religion would still be the most viabie candidate for fostering social
cohesion in contemporary democracies. In the remainder of this chap-
ter I want to elaborate on the significanee of Tocqueville's ideas for con-
temporary society. Many followers of Tocqueville, or those inspired by
his thought, seem to think that on the basis of what Tocqueville wrote
in the nineteenth century they can still contend that religion or
Christianity could be useful as an instrument for social cohesion. Is that
troel Why, in contemporary pluralistic society where ]ews, .Muslims,
Christians, Hindus, Buddhists and unbelievers live under the proteetion
of the American Constitution, should one specific religion be acknowl-
edged and privileged as the supposed foundation of the democratie
order? That requires some explanation indeed. And would Tocqueville,
if he had lived in the twenty-first century, still have attributed to
Christianity the prominent place it took in mid-nineteenth-century
America? These are some questions 'I hope to answer in the pages that
follow.
An analysis of Tocqueville's ideas and
assessment of his significanee for contemporary
social problems
In order to answer these questions, let us now turn to a more close
analysis of Tocqueville's ideas on the importance of religion for the
politieal order. The first thing to be noted is that Tocqueville presup-
poses more than he explicitly argues for. In the correspondence with
Gobineau, for instance, he presupposes that moral ideas would float
in the air, so to say, if they did not have the support of religion. This
is the grist of his critique of English utilitarians like Bentham and
Mil1.60 After the supernatural foundation of morals had been demo1-
ished, the only thing that was left was a secular or utilitarian founda-
tion for morals. Tocqueville considers this to be a shaky foundation.
But is such a negative judgement justified? And what would be the
alternative?
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The obvious alternative for a purely philosophical or secularfoundation
of morals as provided by the utilitarians is, of course, an ethieal theory
known as divine command morality.''! Why is something good? Because
it has been commanded by God. Why is something moraUy rejection-
able? Because it has been forbidden by God. According to adherents of
divine command morality only the divine will can provide us with a
secure basis for morality. But is that true? Further analysis of the theory
presents us with a host of problems.62 First, there is the problem of the
arbitrary character of the divine will. God has forbidden theft and vio-
lence, but what if God had commanded the torture of innocent chil-
dren? Would that make torture morally right? Most people, including
believing Christians, wiU have problems with that position. But if they
do, they presuppose an autonomous idea of good and evil. And this
means that they subscribe to the position that religion is not the basis of
morals, but rather morals the foundation of religion. This simpIe objec-
tion63 is in fact a substantial critique of the religious foundation of
morals.v'
That Tocqueville did not recognize this point as something that dis-
credits his ideas on the social and political significance of religion is
strange, because he was weIl aware of the vicissitudes of lawmaking
. based on religion. In De la démocratie enAmérique Tocqueville comments
on the plans of Connecticut's lawmakers to base their law on sacred
texts. Tocqueville calls that a 'strange idea' eIn drafting those laws, they
hit on the strange idea of drawing upon sacred texts').65 But is this really
so strange after Tocqueville's eulogizing of the Christian influence on
law and polities? 'Whoever shall worship any deity other than the Lord
God shall be put to death', the Connecticut lawmakers proclaimed.
They continued with provisions taken literally from Deuteronomy,
Exodus and Leviticus. In harmony with what they had leamed from
those sacred texts they also declared blasphemy, witchcraft, adultery
and rape punishable by death." A son who failed to honour his father
and mother? This was subject to the same penalty, and social intercourse
between unmarried individuals was subject to severe censure."
Tocqueville comments: 'Thus the laws of a rode and half-civilized peo-
ple were carried over into a society of enlightened spirit and gentle
mores.'68 These penallaws were 'profoundly marked by narrow sectarian
thinking'." He seems shocked because these Puritan legislators pro-
claimed 'even death for Christians who wished to worship God in some
way other than their own'/0 Apparently TocqueviUe does not reekon
these precepts from Holy Scripture to be 'Christian' in the sense he is
advocating when he declares Christianity indispensable for democracy.
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He takes the lawmakers to task because they 'intruded upon the realm of
conscience?' and 'were totally oblivious of the great principles of
religious freedom'. 72
These comments could be expected from a consistent secularist as
Holbach, but how do they fit in with Tocqueville's approach? How can
Tocqueville list all these problematic texts and still say: 'in America, it
was religion that showed the way to enlightenment; it was respect for
divine law that showed man the way to freedom'? Those lawmakers
took the divine will seriously, so it seems, according to Tocqueville per-
haps a little too seriously. What bis treatment of the Connecti.cut law-
makers shows us is that a considerable part of divine inspired texts from
SCripture has to be ignored and left behind before real freedom and civ-
ilization can emerge. 50 Tocqueville can only maintain his thesis on the
intricate conneetion of religion and politics when being at the same
time very selective with regard to the religious sourees of inspiration for
the American constitutional and politicalorder. When Tocqueville
writes that in America somehow the 'spirit of liberty' and the 'spirit of
religion' have been combined we have to gauge what exactly is that
'spirit of religion' . Apparently, it is not making penallaws on the basis of
God's word. The spirit of religion must be something different from
that. But what? Tocqueville does not give us a clear answer to that
question.
The position that we need religion for the maintenance of moral and
politicalorder, can also be criticized on from a more pragmatic angle.
Adherents of this position usually are vague as to the question what reli-
gion is supposed to fulfil that role. Tocqueville uses the words
'Christianity' and 'religion' interchangeably, but if we canvass his entire
oeuvre it is clear that he does not consider every religion suitable for that
function. He vehemently rejects Islam for instance."
The protagonist of the claim that religion should be the basis of the
moral order could, of course, take the position that the religion of the
majority would be best qualifted to fulfil the function of the social bond.
But the problem is that most contemporary societies are multicultural or
multireligious. And the prospects for one religion gaining the upper
hand are not very good, to say the least. Besides, non-establishment
clauses like the first amendment of the American Constitution prohibit
state-ehurehes and official state religions. In combination with freedom
of belief, these are a firm foundation of modem constitutions and this
makes the chances of a majority religion very slim. This would imply
that Tocqueville's ideas on Christianity as the foundation of American
democracy - whatever their value was in the nineteenth century - would
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hardly be an option in contemporary societies. Because the pluralistic or
multicultural composition of the people is a hard fact in contemporary
life, the question is: 'what unites all civilians with different religions?' As
religion can only unite people from the same group yet disunites society
as a whoIe, we have to look for a new souree of inspiration that can bind
the people together.
For post-Enlightenment thinkers like Edmund Burke, Chateaubriand,
Iosephde Maistre and also Tocqueville (although I wiIl qualify this state-
ment hereafter) the republican principles of the French Revolution or
Enlightenment.eould not function as the new civil religion. Some of
these nineteenth-century thinkers advocated a return to religion as the
foundation of the political and moral order as had been the case in the
pre-Enlightenment period. But globalization and demography has now
made this nineteenth-century option obsolete. A longing for one reli-
gion as the unifying factor of contemporary societies is a romantic illu-
sion, a nostalgie desire for a time and culture that no longer exist." As
we have seen, Tocqueville dreams of 'the idea of a single, all-powerfut
being imposing the same laws in the same way on everyone equally'.7S
But this is no longer the world we are living in and probably never will.
beo The adherents of the different denominations will probably never
overcome their differences as to the nature of their GOd.76 More likely is
that, if religion is mixed up with polities, a protracted discussion over
the nature of God wililead us into wars of religion, as we have witnessed
in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe.
If these critical remarks on the social and political function of religion
are justified, then we have to reconsider a kind of secular or denomina-
tionally neutral civil religion. And the next question is: do we find hints
at such a secular civil religion in Tocqueville's work? Or had he bet all his
cards on the religion of Christianity as some other counter-revolutionary
thinkers like joseph de Maistre had done?
The secular reading of Tocqueville
Tocqueville is a complex and, it seems to me, not always consistent
thinker. In a majority of passages in De la démocratie en Amérique and
other books he stresses the need for a religious backup of the moral order
and he appears to oe skeptical about the autonomy of ethics and poli-
ties. Vet there seem to be some footholds for independent polities and
ethics in bis work as weIl, more specifically when he uses the word 'reli-
gion' in a verybroad and non-sectarian way. In Volume One, Part II,
Chapter 10, he comments on his favourite subject, popular sovereignty,
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as an idea that impregnates the whole American minde The idea, or, as
Tocqueville writes, the 'dogma' of popular sovereignty is 'the last link in
a chain of opinions that rings the whole Anglo-American world'." But
then his discourse makes an interesting twist in the direction of reason
(and not faith). Tocqueville writes: 'Providence equipped each individ-
ual ... with the degree of reason necessary to guide his conduct in mat-
ters of exclusive interest to himself alone. This is the great maxim on
which civil and political society in the United States is based.?"
Let us read these words carefully: Providenee endowed man with
reason. Tocqueville continues by telling us that reason and the republic
seem intimately connected, because the republic penetrates into the
ideas, opinions and genera! habits of the Americans, and 'in order for
them to change their laws, they would in a sense have to change them-
selves through and through'." Apparently, it is not only uncritical
acceptance of dogma that is extolled in the work of Tocqueville. Man
can reason about the politicalorder. It is reason that makes it possible to
review the laws in the light of the idea of popular sovereignty, And then
Tocqueville introduces a new conception of 'religion' that is much
broader than Christianity or even theism. He writes:
In the United States, the religion of the majority is itself republican.
That religion subjects the truths of the other world to individual rea-
son, [ust as politics leaves the interestsof this world to the good sense
of all, and it allows each man free choice of the path that is to lead
him to heaven, just as the law grants each citizen the right to choose
his government.ê?
Here religion in the traditional sense is completely evaporated. This is
the civil religion of the Enlightenment thinkers. Tocqueville does not
advocate Christianity or Catholicism as the bond uniting all the citizens
of the Republic, but their faith in reason and in popular sovereignty. The
republican conviction is here portrayed as the 'religion' that animates
the American politicalorder.
In this passage the great aristocratie Frenchman subscribes more to
the Enlightenment ideas of the eighteenth-century radicals than to the
enlightened conservatism of thinkers like Burke and Chateaubriand that
resonates in other parts of his oeuvre. The only thing, even in this pas-
sage, that reminds us of his predilection for the 'dogmatism' that ani-
mates the rest of bis work, is that the republican principle itself is
proclaimed as a .dogma that cannot be scrutinized by reason: 'The repub-
lican principle reigns in America today as the monarchical principle
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dominated France under Louis XIV. '81 The republican principle,
Tocqueville adds, is accepted in America without combat, without oppo-
sition, without proof: 'by a tacit accord, a sort of consensus universalis' .82
On the basis of these passages it is possible to interpret Tocqueville not
only as the founding father of the 'Christian view' that links the
American Republic to Christianity, but also to see him as the expounder
of the notion of a 'civil religion' that is much broader than religion in its
confessional meaning.
Let us go back to an older commentator on Tocqueville's work, Iohn
Nef. Nef writes: 'Beliefs have played and are playing compelling parts in
history. All of us believe in something.v" Indeed, in something. But judg-
ing from the Tocqueville passage quoted above, this can just as weIl be a
secularist philosophy. It mayalso be possible to refer to common values
as the binding element in contemporary soeteties. such as faith in
democracy, in human rights, or in the rule of law. Apologists for belief
tend to ignore or disavow the unifying potentialof secular creeds. Vet
Nef as weIl comes very close to the view that secular creeds can fulfil this
function, as is clear from the following words:
If belief is an inevitable part of individual experience, nothing is per-
. haps of greater moment than the question whether men and women
generally have accessible any belief capable of uniting rather than
dividing them, any belief that win nourish the gentie virtues and
help [ustice, charity, compassion and love, rather than hatred, [eal-
ousy, fear, and the lust for power, to gain, and now (if given reign)
almost inevitably to destroy the world.ê?
This is indeed the central question: is there 'any belief capable of unit-
ing rather than dividing' the people that have to share the territory of
the state? This question cannot be answered by simply proposing your
own religieus conviction.
So Tocqueville is important, not because of what he has written about
the specific importance of Christianity for democracy, but because of his
emphasis on what we now call a 'civil religion'. Sanford Kessler writes:
'Perhaps the most important conclusion to emerge from the contempo-
rary civil religion debate so far is that religton in some form is esserittal
for a well-ordered demoeratic pOlity.'85 I stress 'in some form'. Kessler
cites Will Herberg, who contends that every society requires a shared
religieus faith, which gives its citizens the basic ideas, values, rituals and
symbols that make commonpoliticallife possible." Using one of the
existing world religions for that purpose would demean that religion
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and cause civil strife in a multireligious society." Thus, if we want to
make Tocqueville relevant for our contemporary democracies we have
to interpret him as the propounder of a civil religion, not as advocating
Christianity as social mooring. Fortunately, there are several passages
that make this 'civil-religion reading' of Tocqueville viable.
Another passage where Tocqueville indicated that the success of the
American Republic results from much more than religion, in the narrow
sense of the word, is to be found in Chapter 8 of the fust book of De la
démocratie enAmérique. Tocqueville writes:
The thirteen colonies that simultaneously threw off the English yoke
at the end of the last century shared the same religion, the same lan-
guage, the same mores, and almost the same laws; they fought a
common enemy; they should therefore have powerful reasons to
unite closely with one another and consolidate as a single natron."
It is clear from this passage that the first Americans shared much more
than just 'religion', in the confessional sense that Tocqueville, in other
passages of De la démocratie, singles out as the foremost if not sole factor
of social cohesion. What about the motivating factor of sharing a com-
mon history, for instance? Tocqueville is aware of a 'harmony between
fortune and human efforts' in Amertca." What was the souree of that
harmony? Was it a shared religion? Tocqueville answers: 'America was a
new nation, yet the people who lived there had long been accustomed
to the exercise of liberty elsewhere. These were two great causes of
domestic order,"? In other words, it had novelty and the sense of free-
dom in its genes. That is what distinguished America from other nations -
not religion in the narrow sense.
In yet another passage Tocqueville points out that the founding
fathers of the American Republic were outstanding and independent
thinkers: 'the men who framed the laws of the Union were almost all
remarkable for their enlightenment and still more remarkable for their
patrtottsm'.?'
1 do not want to contend that my 'secular reading' of Tocqueville is
the only one possible. There are many passages where Tocqueville seems
to understand confessional religion or even Christianity as the firm
foundation 'of the American republic. In many places Tocqueville
presents us with sweeping generalizations such as:
It was religion that gave birth to Anglo-American societies. This
must always be borne in mind. Hence religion in the United States
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is inextricably intertwined with all the national habits and all the
feelings to which the fatherland gives rise. This gives it a peculiar
force.92
In such passages Tocqueville apparently overlooks that historical
influence and viability for the future are completely different things. It
may he true that Christianity exerted a great historical influence on the
founding of the American republic but that nonetheless only a secular
state has prospects for the future. Tocqueville's admirer and contempo-
rary, Iohn Stuart Mill, understood this very well. He wrote some insight-
ful essays on the relationship between morals and religion that are in
some respects more subtle than the ideas of the great Frenchman. Mill
wrote:
They say, that religion alone can teach us what morality is; that all the
high morality ever recognized by mankind, was leamt from religion;
that the greatest uninspired philosophers in their sublimest flights,
stopt far short of the Christian morality, and whatever inferior moral-
ity they may have attained to (by the assistance, as many think, of dim
traditions derived from the Hebrew books, or from a primeval revela-
tion), they never could induce the common mass of their fellow citi-
zens to accept it from them. That, only whena morality is understood
to come from the Gods, do men in general adopt it, rally round it, and
lend their human sanctions for its enforcement. That granting the suf-
ficiency of human motives to make the rule obeyed, were it not for the
religious idea we should not have had the rule itself.93
Mill is not reluctant to acknowledge this: 'There is truth in much of
this', But he adds one important proviso: 'There is truth in much of this,
considered as a matterofhistory?" Ancient peoples have generally under-
stood their morals, their Iaws, their intellectual beliefs and even their
practical arts of life as revelations from superior powers." That does not
mean, however, that this is necessarily the case. When people were sav-
ages, moral precepts needed god-given sanctions. But as civilization
advances, it must be possible to uphold moral values without divine
sanctions. The secularist position is clearly stated by Mill when he
writes: 'Are not moral truths strong enough in their own evidence, at all
events to retain the belief of mankind when once they have acquired
it?'96 Mill points out that much of what is considered specifically
Christian morality is equalled in the Meditations .of Marcus Aurelius,
which we have no ground for believing to have been in any way
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indebted to Chnstiantty," Vet whatever may be the souree of s~me
moral precepts, the relevant question is whether they can stand on their
own feet. Even if some of the precepts of jesus were an original
contribution to our moral heritage, it has become the property of
humanity and cannot now be lost by anything short of a return to
primeval barbarism.98
In his correspondence with Gobineau, Tocqueville indicated that he
considered the ideas of therutilitaires anglais' as rather shallow.?? I do
not think this judgement is very judicious. Mill understood better than
Tocqueville what the future had in store for us, although also in the
work of Tocqueville there are moorings for a civil religion of a non-
denominational character. A secular reading of Tocqueville seems possi-
bie and probably this aspect of his work has greater significanee for the
future than many scholars seem to realize.
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